Taming of Pict

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Hypothesis: Advantages of the object-capability security paradigm

- POLA can be obeyed without discomfort
- expressivness
- elegance
- efficiency
- smaller TCB

Limitations

- source code of all parts of the system must be available

Contents

An example of “can call” relationship



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

The Problem: Required authority of the untrusted VGA driver

- to read from the `0x3D5` I/O register
- to read from the `0x3D4` I/O register
- to write to the `0x3D4` I/O register
- to write to the frame buffer

An example of “can call” relationship



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

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

An example of “can call” relationship

```
io.read.byte
```

```
\() = (io.read.byte 981)
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

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

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

Powerboxed `ClockMorph`



Powerboxed `ping`

```
kosik@debian:~/work/noweb/ping$ sudo ./ping 209.85.135.103
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=1
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=2
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=3
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=4
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=5
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=6
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=7
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=8
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=9
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=10
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=11
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=12
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=13
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=14
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=15
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=16
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=17
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=18
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=19
28 bytes from 209.85.135.103: icmp_seq=20
UNIX signal 2 was received. Terminating by default.
kosik@debian:~/work/noweb/ping$
```

Reference Graph Dynamics [1, §9.2]

- connectivity by initial conditions
- connectivity by parenthood
- connectivity by introduction
- connectivity by endowment

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Layers of the Pict programming language



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

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

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

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

Contents

The original standard library



Refactored library



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Open Problems

- any untrusted component can consume as much memory as it wishes
- any untrusted component can consume as much CPU ticks as it wishes
- formal methods can significantly refine assessments of upperbound of threat we face

References

Mark Samuel Miller.
Robust Composition: Towards a Unified Approach to Access Control and Concurrency Control.
PhD thesis, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, USA, May 2006.

Robin Milner.
Communicating and Mobile Systems: The π-calculus.
Cambridge University Press, 1999.

The original π-calculus (the syntax) [2]

$$\pi ::= \bar{x}y \mid x(z) \mid \tau \mid [x = y]\pi$$

$$P ::= (P \mid P) \mid \nu z P \mid !P \mid M$$

$$M ::= 0 \mid \pi.P \mid M + M$$

Matching action was omitted

$$\pi ::= \bar{x}y \mid x(z) \mid \tau$$

$$P ::= (P \mid P) \mid \nu z P \mid !P \mid M$$

$$M ::= 0 \mid \pi.P \mid M + M$$

Silent action was omitted

$$\pi ::= \bar{x}y \mid x(z)$$

$$P ::= (P \mid P) \mid \nu z P \mid !P \mid M$$

$$M ::= 0 \mid \pi.P \mid M + M$$

The Choice operator was omitted

$$\pi \quad ::= \quad \bar{x}y \mid x(z)$$

$$P \quad ::= \quad (P \mid P) \mid \nu zP \mid !P \mid M$$

$$M \quad ::= \quad 0 \mid \pi.P$$

Only asynchronous sends are allowed

$$P ::= (P \mid P) \mid \nu z P \mid !P \mid M$$

$$M ::= 0 \mid \bar{x}y.0 \mid x(z).P$$

It does not make sense to replicate $\bar{x}y.0$ particles

$$P ::= (P \mid P) \mid \nu z P \mid \nu x\,(!x(z).P \mid P) \mid M$$

$$M ::= 0 \mid \bar{x}y.0 \mid x(z).P$$

Cleaned up grammar of this subcalculus

$$
\begin{array}{rcl}
P & ::= & 0 \\
 & | & \bar{x}y.0 \\
 & | & x(z).P \\
 & | & \nu z P \\
 & | & (P \mid P) \\
 & | & \nu x\,(\,!x(z).P \;\mid\; P\,)
\end{array}
$$

. . . in ASCII

```
P  ::=  ()
      |  xy
      |  x?z = Proc
      |  (new z:^Type Proc)
      |  (Proc | Proc)
      |  (def x = Proc Proc)
```